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Abstract 
Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, many empirical studies find a high degree of 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). However, the resulting macroeconomic effects 
seem to be surprisingly weak. This contradiction can be explained within an intertemporal 
framework in which DNWR not only prevents nominal wage cuts but also induces firms to 
compress wage increases. We analyze whether a compression of wage increases occurs 
when DNWR is binding by applying Unconditional Quantile Regression and Seemingly Unre-
lated Regression to a data set comprising more than 169 million wage changes. We find evi-
dence for a compression of wage increases and only very small effects of DNWR on average 
real wage growth. The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument 
against low inflation targets. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Viele empirische Studien, die die Komprimierung von Lohnkürzungen betrachteten, finden 
einen hohen Grad an Abwärtsnominallohnstarrheit (ANLS). Die resultierenden makroökono-
mischen Effekte scheinen jedoch überraschend gering zu sein. Dieser Widerspruch kann in 
einem intertemporalen Rahmen erklärt werden, in dem ANLS nicht nur Nominallohnkürzun-
gen verhindert, sondern auch dazu führt, dass Firmen Lohnerhöhungen komprimieren. Wir 
analysieren mit Hilfe von Unconditional Quantile Regression und Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gression, ob eine Komprimierung von Lohnerhöhungen stattfindet wenn ANLS vorliegt. Der 
hierfür genutzt Datensatz umfasst mehr als 169 Millionen Lohnänderungen. Wir finden Evi-
denz für eine Komprimierung von Lohnerhöhungen und nur sehr geringe Effekte von ALNS 
auf das durchschnittliche Reallohnwachstum. Die Ergebnisse deuten daraufhin, dass ANLS 
kein starkes Argument gegen die Zielsetzung niedriger Inflationsraten liefert. 
 
JEL classification: E24, E31, J31 
 
Keywords: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity; Wage Stickiness; Wage Compression; Un-
conditional Quantile Regression 
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1 Introduction 
Concerns about potentially adverse employment effects of low inflation have given rise to a 
plethora of studies on the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), such as the 
micro-econometric multi-country studies of Behr and Poetter (2010), Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2009) and Dickens et al. (2007) or the survey evidence provided by Bewley (1999).1
A possible solution to that puzzle has been offered by Elsby (2009), who develops an in-
tertemporal model in which downward wage rigidity arises because nominal wage cuts are 
followed by sharp decreases in productivity. Wage increases therefore become irreversible to 
some degree. Firms that increase wages during upswings may find it difficult to reverse their 
decisions later when the economic environment will possibly deteriorate. Forward-looking 
firms take the path dependence of wage changes into account when determining the optimal 
wage policy; they refrain from large wage increases in order to reduce the probability of 
costly future nominal wage cuts. Moreover, since DNWR raises the wage level inherited from 
the past, firms do not have to raise wages as much or as often as in a situation without wage 
rigidity to obtain the profit-maximizing wage level. As a consequence, firms will compress 
wage increases as well as wage cuts in the presence of DNWR. This leads to the surprising 
prediction that average real wage growth, and hence aggregate real wages, should not be 
affected by DNWR, and that the aggregate employment effects should be weak or non-
existent. 
 These 
concerns are based on Tobin’s (1972) hypothesis that if nominal wages are downwardly rigid 
a certain amount of positive inflation may be necessary to ease firms’ real wage adjustments 
in response to idiosyncratic shocks (“inflation may grease the wheels of the labor market”). 
Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, microeconometric studies usually find a high 
degree of DNWR. However, the resulting macroeconomic effects on aggregate real wages 
and employment seem to be surprisingly weak, leading Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a 
“micro-macro puzzle”. 
This paper aims to provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the effects of inflation on the 
shape of the log real wage change distribution. It does so by applying Unconditional Quantile 
Regressions (UQR) to the data, in addition to variants of Elsby’s (2009) OLS model specifi-
cation. The latter only allows the use of aggregate data on the regional level, whereas the 
application of UQR to the data enables us to take account of the variance and the cross vari-
able covariance in the micro data. In line with the empirical literature on DNWR the analysis 
focuses on the wage change distribution of job stayers, whereas Elsby’s analysis also in-
cludes job movers. This inclusion could lead to a systematic relationship between inflation 
and the compression of the real wage change distribution that has nothing to do with down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. The reason is that during economic upswings inflation often 
rises, and at the same time more voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real 
wage increases (see e.g. Cornelißen et al. 2007). 
                                                
1  Dickens et al. (2007) also deal with the extent of real wage rigidities. Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) 
have carried out a multi-country study on downward nominal wage rigidity using industry data.  
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The empirical analysis is undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 using the 
IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File, of the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The BeH comprises the total 
population gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. After our data se-
lection, the remaining spells enable us to analyze over 169 million earnings changes amount-
ing to more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year on average. 
Among the main advantages of this dataset are the sheer wealth of information and the high 
reliability of the earnings data, which is due to plausibility checks performed by the social 
security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting. In contrast to stud-
ies based on compensation data from household surveys, measurement error due to errone-
ous reporting does not arise in our analysis. The analysis for Germany also provides some 
insights into whether Elsby’s (2009) predictions can be observed in a country that may al-
ready be affected by wage compression due to its labour market institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the key 
findings of Elsby’s (2009) model. Section 3 contains the data description. Section 4 presents 
our empirical implementation and results as well as a comparison with Elsby’s results. Sec-
tion 5 deals with the macroeconomic implications, and Section 6 concludes. 
2 The Model 
In this section we explain the main idea of the underlying model and present the key findings 
needed for the empirical testing.  
The main feature of Elsby’s (2009) intertemporal model of worker resistance to wage cuts is 
that wage increases become irreversible to some degree because nominal wage cuts lead to 
a sharp decrease in productivity. This assumption is based on Bewley’s (1999) findings that 
a key reason for the reluctance to cut nominal wages is the belief that nominal wage reduc-
tions could damage worker morale, and that morale is a key determinant of worker productiv-
ity. A wage increase will raise productivity, however, a wage cut of the same amount will re-
duce productivity by a greater amount. Formally, this is captured by an effort function in the 
spirit of the fair-wage effort hypothesis of Solow (1979) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986), with 
an additional term reflecting the impact of nominal wage cuts on effort. 
( )1
1
lnln −
−
<





+




= WW
W
W
c
B
W
e I , ( )1  
where W  is the nominal wage, 1−W  is the lagged nominal wage, 0>c  is a parameter varying 
the productivity costs of a nominal wage cut to the firm, and ( )⋅I  is the indicator function for a 
nominal wage cut. Real unemployment benefits PBb =  are assumed to be constant over 
time, where B  denotes nominal unemployment benefits and P  is the price level. The price 
level evolves according to 1−= tt PeP
π , where π reflects the inflation rate. 
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Given the effort function ( )1 , Elsby (2009) considers a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model. In 
the model price-taking worker-firm pairs maximize the expected discounted value of profits 
by choosing the nominal wage tW  at each date t . The worker-firms’ productivity function is 
given by ( ) ePA × , where A  denotes a nominal technology shock. The shock is idiosyncratic 
to the worker-firm pair, is observed contemporaneously, and acts as the source of uncer-
tainty in the model. The shocks evolve according to a geometric random walk. This has the 
implication that average nominal productivity rises in line with inflation π  and productivity 
growth µ . 
The value of a job in recursive form is given by 
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where )1,0[∈β  is the real discount factor of the firm. Lagged values are denoted by the sub-
script -1, and forward values by a prime. By setting 0=c  the model is reduced to a fric-
tionless model. It can be shown that frictionless nominal wages are equal to the nominal 
shock A , hence wage changes fully reflect changes in productivity.  
DNWR changes the shape of the frictionless wage change distribution in two characteristic 
ways. First, there is a range of values for the nominal shock A , for which the firm finds it 
optimal not to change the nominal wage. This leads to a spike at zero in the nominal wage 
change distribution and accordingly to a spike at minus the inflation rate in the real wage 
change distribution. Second, if the change in A  is strong enough and the firm decides to 
change the nominal wage, the wage change will be compressed relatively to the frictionless 
case. Not surprisingly, wage cuts are compressed because they imply a discontinuous fall in 
productivity at the margins. More interestingly, the model predicts that wage increases are 
compressed as well. One reason is that forward-looking firms take the path dependence of 
wage changes into account when determining the optimal wage policy; they refrain from 
large wage increases in order to reduce the probability of costly future nominal wage cuts. 
Moreover, the firms will in general inherit higher wages from the past. Consequently, firms do 
not have to increase nominal wages by as much or as often in order to achieve the desired 
wage level.  
Figure 1 shows simulated real wage change distributions for high and low inflation based on 
the predictions of the theoretical model. One can see that real wage increases are com-
pressed in the case of low inflation.2
                                                
2  In the simulation the rate of productivity growth has been kept constant. Similar effects on the real 
wage change distribution are obtained if the (average) rate of productivity growth is changed in-
stead of a change in the inflation rate.  
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Fig. 1.  Figure shows simulated log real wage change distributions after 15 iterations. The distributions 
have been simulated using Elsby’s (2009) model. Own simulation of 10,000 wage changes 
with DNWR (c = 0.06). Further model settings: 1% productivity growth; β = 0.97. 
 
Notice that in the absence of DNWR a change in the productivity growth rate should lead to a 
one-to-one shift of the real wage change distribution, whereas a change in the inflation rate 
should leave the distribution unaltered. In contrast, if DNWR exists, one should observe a 
systematic relationship between changes in the inflation rate and/or productivity growth rate 
on the one hand and changes in the shape of the real wage change distribution on the other 
hand. In the following, we will focus on the impact of the inflation rate on the shape of the real 
wage change distribution because the inflation rate can be controlled by monetary policy. 
The compression of nominal wage changes will have effects on the percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution. If DNWR is present, the model generates the following predictions 
about the effect of the inflation rate on the percentiles of the real wage change distribution, 
depending on whether the percentiles 
1. lie below the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
2. lie in the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
3. lie above the range of zero nominal wage changes. 
(1) Nominal wage cuts will be compressed relatively to the frictionless case, because of the 
implied fall in productivity. The probability that a firm is willing to increase nominal wages will 
increase as the inflation rate and productivity growth rise. With higher inflation and/or higher 
productivity growth a firm is more likely to reverse nominal wage cuts in the future. As a re-
sult, a firm is less inclined to incur the costs of wage cuts. With higher inflation one should 
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therefore observe fewer and less pronounced nominal wage cuts. The model therefore im-
plies that low percentiles of the real wage change distribution, lying below the range of zero 
nominal wage change, will rise with the inflation rate and productivity growth. 
(2) Because of DNWR a non-negligible range of the percentiles of real wage changes will 
correspond exactly to zero nominal wage changes and therefore be equal to minus the infla-
tion rate. The model implies that those percentiles of the real wage change distribution fall 
one-to-one with the inflation rate. With higher inflation firms affected by DNWR are able to 
achieve reductions in real labor costs without falling back on costly nominal wage cuts. It is in 
this sense that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market in the presence of DNWR. 
(3) In an uncertain world a firm affected by DNWR will also compress nominal wage in-
creases because raising wages increases the likelihood of costly future nominal wage cuts. If 
inflation is low, upper percentiles of the wage change distribution will, therefore, be reduced 
relative to the frictionless case. The probability that a firm wishes to reduce nominal wages 
will decline when the inflation rate and productivity growth rise. In this case, firms are less 
likely to cut wages in the future, and no longer need to restrain increases as much as a pre-
caution against future costly nominal wage cuts. On average this should lead to a more than 
one-to-one increase of the upper percentiles of real wage change distribution with productiv-
ity growth as well as to an increase with inflation. 
Because of this discussion, one expects the following coefficients in a regression of the per-
centiles of the log real wage change distribution on the inflation rate and the productivity 
growth rate as explanatory variables, see Table 1. 
Table 1:  Predicted effects of the rate of inflation and of productivity growth on the uncondi-
tional percentiles of the log real wage change distribution 
τ th percentile of the log real 
wage change distribution τP  
Coefficient on 
inflation rate productivity growth 
<τP  minus inflation rate > 0 > 1 
≈τP  minus inflation rate < 0 attenuates towards zero (< 1) 
>τP  minus inflation rate > 0 > 1 
 
3 Data 
The empirical analysis is undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 using the 
IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The BeH comprises the total 
population gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. Not covered are 
self-employed, family workers assisting in the operation of a family business, civil servants 
(Beamte) and regular students. For the years 1975 until 2007, the BeH contains information 
about 72,695,902 people as well as 1,171,326,023 employment spells (IAB Beschäftigten-
Historik 2009). Important advantages of this dataset are the enormous amount of information 
and the high reliability of the earnings data, which is due to plausibility checks performed by 
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the social security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting. In con-
trast to studies based on compensation data from household surveys measurement error 
due to erroneous reporting should not arise in our analysis. 
The earnings data are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitrags-
bemessungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored earnings changes cannot 
be computed. For our analysis we use non-censored earnings spells of male employees from 
West Germany aged 16 to 65. In line with the literature our analysis is confined to “job stay-
ers”, i.e. employees who have a “stable employment relationship” with an employer. Usually, 
job stayers are defined as full-time working employees who do not change the employer be-
tween two consecutive time periods. We apply a narrower and better suited concept and re-
quire that the employee continually exercises the same job at the same employer for at least 
two consecutive years.3
After the selection 169 million earnings changes remain in our sample. We are therefore able 
to analyze an average of more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year. The sample size 
is a large advantage in comparison to the data applied in Elsby (2009). His largest data set, 
the NES for Great Britain, allows him to analyze on average less than 74,000 observations 
per year. For the US it is less than 24,000 (1,800) observations using the CPS (PSID). A fur-
ther advantage of the German data is the longer time period of 32 years compared to 21-24 
years in Elsby’s analysis. A disadvantage of the German data is the fact that we are not able 
to observe hourly wages, but daily wages. There is also the problem that shifts from part-time 
to full-time work and vice versa that occur during the course of the year do not lead to a new 
report of the employer.
 In contrast to our data selection Elsby (2009) includes job movers in 
his analysis. This inclusion could lead to a systematic relationship between inflation and the 
compression of the wage change distribution that has nothing to do with downward nominal 
wage rigidity (DNWR). The reason is that during economic upswings inflation usually rises, 
and at the same time more voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage 
increases (Cornelißen et al. 2007). 
4
As inflation rate we use the log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and alternatively 
the log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany. The CPI is more relevant for 
employees, whereas the PPI is crucial for firms’ wage setting. Following Elsby (2009), we 
measure productivity growth using the observed average regional real wage change. The 
reason for not directly using a productivity measure is that real wages adjust to changes in 
 Since such shifts are much more common for female employees 
(see e.g. Schäfer/Vogel 2005), we exclude women from our analysis. This is in contrast to 
Elsby’s analysis in which male and female employees are included. 
                                                
3  The breakdown of occupations is very detailed, but still not every job change leads to a change in 
the occupation classification. Therefore, some spells of persons who changed the job within a firm 
may not be excluded. The narrower “same position”-restriction has also been applied by Christofi-
des and Stengos (2001). 
4  A new state is conveyed with the annual report at the end of a year. This state applies for the whole 
year. 
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productivity with a time lag. We would have to model some kind of error-correction mecha-
nism for the discrepancy between real wage changes and productivity growth. We can avoid 
these complications by using the average regional real wage change as a proxy variable re-
flecting the impact of (regional) productivity growth on wages. It is a suitable proxy since ac-
cording to the theoretical predictions DNWR should have no effect on average wage 
changes. 
Among the other control variables the absolute change in the rate of inflation is included. 
This is motivated by the hypothesis of Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) that higher inflation 
volatility yields greater dispersion in relative wages regardless of the existence of DNWR. 
The current and lagged regional unemployment rates are included because DNWR may af-
fect unemployment. The unemployment rates are used to control for changes in the wage 
change distribution due to workers “leaving” the distribution. Further control variables for the 
applied regression methods are shown in Table 2. For more details concerning the data and 
the data selection see Appendix A. 
Table 2: Variables for the applied regression methods 
 Seemingly Unrelated  Regression / OLS Regression 
Unconditional Quantile  
Regression 
Dependent Variable 
Real wage change 
τ th percentile from re-weighted re-
gional log real wage change distribu-
tion 
Recentered influence function (RIF) of 
the individual log real wage change 
Explanatory Variables 
Inflation rate Log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany Alternatively: log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany 
Productivity growth  Average regional real wage change 
Further Control Variables 
Micro Variables 
Age  Mean age of employees in region Age Age squared 
Education Percentages of employees in region within 7 educational classes Education class of employee 
Foreign nationality Percentage of employees in region with foreign nationality 
Dummy for employee with foreign 
nationality 
Occupation Percentages of employees in region within 6 occupational fields Occupation field of the employee 
Worker Percentage of white-collar worker in the region Dummy for white-collar worker 
Regional Variables 
Absolute change in 
the rate of inflation Absolute change in the rate of inflation (CPI or PPI) 
Unemployment rate 
Current regional unemployment rate 
Lagged regional unemployment rate 
Dummy Variables 
Year 1984 
Before 1984 the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. Since 
1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to social security 
taxation and are therefore included in the data. This leads to a level effect on 
the 1983-1984 earning changes. For more details see Appendix A. 
Regions Dummies for the 10 old West German states (excluding Berlin) 
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4 Empirical Implementation and Results 
Elsby (2009) uses an OLS regression to estimate the effect of the inflation rate and the aver-
age regional real wage change (as proxy for productivity growth) on the percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution and finds evidence for wage compression for the upper per-
centiles. A disadvantage of this OLS regression is that only aggregate data at regional level 
can be used, thereby neglecting the variance and the cross variable covariance in the micro 
data. First, an identical mean does not imply that the distributions are identical, too. Sec-
ondly, for example, it is possible to observe two regions with the same mean age of the em-
ployees and the same composition of the educational classes. Using OLS regression these 
two regions are identical in terms of age and education. But a closer look could reveal that in 
one region mainly young employees are highly educated while in the other region mainly 
older employees are highly educated. Therefore micro data should be used for the analysis 
wherever possible. 
Because of the above mentioned critique we apply two regressions methods. In order to en-
able a comparison with Elsby’s (2009) results, we first apply variants of his OLS approach to 
our data and estimate the impact of inflation and other variables on the percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution. Those approaches only include aggregate data on regional level. 
Secondly, we apply a new regression method proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) 
– Unconditional Quantile Regression. It allows to use micro data and to estimate the impact 
of explanatory variables, like inflation, on the percentiles of the unconditional real wage 
change distribution. The advantage of UQR over OLS is that it takes the whole distribution of 
the explanatory variables into account.5
4.1 Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression 
 
To assess whether the shape of the real wage change distribution varies systematically with 
the inflation rate because of DNWR, we have to make sure that observed differences in the 
shape of the distribution are not due to changes in other variables, like age or regional com-
position of the workforce. To that end we apply the method of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996), henceforth “DFL”, that enables the estimation of counterfactual (re-weighted) real 
wage change distributions that would prevail if the distribution of worker characteristics did 
not change. The worker characteristics for the re-weighted density are age, class of worker, 
a dummy for foreign nationality, qualification level and occupational field.6
                                                
5  We also applied Quantile Regression to the data to look at the effects of the inflation rate or of pro-
ductivity growth on the real wage change distribution conditional on the attributes of the employee 
and conditional on the region where the employee works. The results are shown in Appendix B. 
 The DFL method 
is useful because it requires no parametric assumptions on the effect of these controls on 
wage changes. 
6  See DiNardo et al. (1996) for a description of the procedure. We used a slightly adjusted version of 
the dfl.ado file from Azevedo (2005) for the estimations. Using the group option of the dfl com-
mand, we apply the DFL method to each region. As the “base year” we choose the final sample 
year (2007). The weights are estimated using a probit model. 
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We use the re-weighted real wage change distributions to calculate the τ th percentile of the 
distribution for region r at time t ( )rtP ,τ , with τ  = 10, 20, ..., 90. As a first approach we esti-
mate the effect of the inflation rate, π , on rtP ,τ  using regressions of the following form: 
rtrtrtrtrttrt μπηP ,
'
,,
'
, ττττττττττ εαεϕλα ++=++++= βxz  ( )3  
As inflation rate, π , we alternatively use the log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and the log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany. In eq. ( )3  we take into 
account that the location of the real wage change distribution for region r at time t depends 
on productivity growth rtµ  – measured as average regional real wage growth. The vector rtz
contains further control variables shown in Table 2.  
Since we regress the different percentiles of one single distribution, the residuals are very 
likely simultaneously correlated across equations. Therefore, we use a Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) approach within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with 
small-sample adjustment and weighting by region size:7
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The results of the SUR estimates can be found in Table 3.8
For reference, Table 3 also reports estimates on the effects of inflation and productivity 
growth on lower percentiles. Note that the predictions of the model on the coefficients for 
lower percentiles depend on the position of zero nominal wage change in the distribution of 
the real wage change distribution (see Table 1). 
 Our results show that the upper 
tail of the wage change distribution is compressed as a result of DNWR as predicted by the 
model (see Table 1). The estimated impact of the inflation rate is significantly positive at least 
for the 80-90th percentiles; the coefficients on productivity growth - measured as average 
regional real wage change - highly significantly exceed unity for these percentiles. These 
results are consistent with lower inflation leading to a compression of wage increases. 
                                                
7  We performed “within” Fixed Effects and Random Effects regressions for all percentiles. For each 
percentile we tested whether or not there are significant differences in the coefficients of the two 
regressions using Hausman-Tests. The Hausman-Test was rejected for every percentile, therefore 
we use a Fixed Effects model.  
8  For comparison, the results of a LSDV regression ignoring the contemporaneous correlation of the 
residuals are documented in Table C1 of Appendix C. 
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Table 3:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution 
 Consumer Price Index Productivity growth   Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
 Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.100 0.026 0.000 0.875 0.024 0.000  p10 0.010 0.012 0.387 0.930 0.023 0.000 
p20 -0.142 0.014 0.000 0.825 0.013 0.000  p20 -0.038 0.006 0.000 0.865 0.013 0.000 
p30 -0.104 0.016 0.000 0.901 0.015 0.000  p30 -0.034 0.007 0.000 0.928 0.013 0.000 
p40 -0.111 0.020 0.000 0.940 0.019 0.000  p40 -0.073 0.008 0.000 0.932 0.015 0.000 
p50 -0.092 0.017 0.000 0.943 0.016 0.000  p50 -0.064 0.006 0.000 0.936 0.013 0.000 
p60 -0.042 0.015 0.005 0.978 0.014 0.000  p60 -0.044 0.006 0.000 0.962 0.011 0.000 
p70 0.011 0.013 0.383 1.001 0.012 0.000  p70 -0.016 0.005 0.003 0.984 0.011 0.000 
p80 0.058 0.016 0.000 1.028 0.015 0.000  p80 0.014 0.007 0.048 1.016 0.014 0.000 
p90 0.102 0.031 0.001 1.067 0.029 0.000  p90 0.055 0.013 0.000 1.071 0.026 0.000 
SUR with small-sample adjustment weighted by region size. Controls: regions, mean age, absolute change in inflation, current 
and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, percentage of the educational classes, percentage of workers with 
foreign nationality, percentage of white-collar worker, percentage of the occupational fields. 
The results for percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are consistent with the 
predictions of the model. In our data the spike at zero nominal wage change predominantly 
appears above the 10th and below the 30th percentile. In this percentile range the coefficients 
on the inflation rate are significantly negative and the coefficients on productivity growth at-
tenuate towards zero. 
For percentiles that predominantly lie below the range of zero nominal wage changes – in 
our case the 10th percentile – the prediction of the model often fails. This may be due to the 
fact that for 8 years the spike at zero nominal changes lies between the 10th and the 5th per-
centiles. For the 10th percentiles the coefficients on productivity growth are higher than those 
of the 20th percentiles, but they do not rise above unity as predicted by the model. Using the 
CPI as inflation rate the coefficient on inflation is significantly negative. Using the PPI the 
coefficient is positive, but not significant. Here the prediction of the model fails – it predicts a 
coefficient of the inflation rate larger than zero for very low percentiles. 
Comparison with results for the US and the UK 
For the empirical analysis Elsby (2009) uses data taken from the New Earnings Survey 
(NES, 1975-1999) for the UK and data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID, 1971-1992) and the Current Population Survey (CPS, 1979-2002) for the US. He 
uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions with region-specific dummies - a Least Squares 
Dummy Variable regression - to explain variations in the τ th percentile of the DFL re-
weighted real wage growth distribution by the inflation rate, average regional wage change 
rate (as proxy for productivity growth) and various control variables. 
The results are similar to the results for Germany using the CPI as inflation rate. They pro-
vide evidence that as a result of DNWR the upper tail of the real wage change distribution is 
compressed. For the three data sets the estimated impact of inflation is positive for the 70-
90th percentiles and often significant. The coefficients on productivity growth exceed unity for 
these upper percentiles of the real wage change distribution and are strongly significant.  
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For the range of zero nominal wage change the coefficients on inflation are negative, and the 
coefficients on productivity growth attenuate towards zero for all these percentiles. For per-
centiles below the range at zero nominal wage changes the effect of higher inflation is dimin-
ishing – but not significantly positive. Here the prediction of the model fails as for Germany. 
The coefficient on average regional wage change rises above unity using CPS and NES 
data. 
4.2 Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using 
Unconditional Quantile Regression 
In the following we apply the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) approach proposed 
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to estimate the impact of explanatory variables, like in-
flation, on the percentiles of the unconditional real wage change distribution taking into ac-
count the variance and cross variable covariance in the micro data.9
X
 This regression method 
allows to estimate the impact of changes in the distribution of explanatory variables, , on 
the marginal percentiles of the dependent variable, Y . A further advantage of applying UQR 
to the data is that we do not need to apply the DFL method in the first step to estimate coun-
terfactual wage change distributions. 
To estimate the average marginal effect [ ][ ]XX dPYdE /|Pr τ>  Firpo et al. (2009) propose, 
inter alia, a Recentered Influence Function OLS (RIF-OLS) regression. This regression pro-
vides consistent estimates if [ ]xPY => X|Pr τ  is linear in x . In case of quantiles the condi-
tional expectation of the recentered influence function ( )[ ]X|,; YFPYRIFE τ  can be viewed as 
an Unconditional Quantile Regression. 
The RIF-OLS consists of regressing the (recentered) influence function RIF  of the outcome 
variable Y  for the thτ  percentile τP  on the explanatory variables X  by OLS. The RIF  is 
computed by estimating the sample percentile τP  and the density of the outcome variable 
( )⋅Yf

, using kernel (or other) methods: ( ) ( ) ττττ ,2,1 ˆˆ;ˆ cPYcPYFIR  +>⋅= I , where ( )⋅I  is an in-
dicator function, ( )ττ PYfc 1,1 =
 , ( )τPYf  is the density of Y  evaluated at τP  and 
( )ττττ −⋅−= 1,1,2 cPc
 . We follow Firpo et al. and use a kernel density estimator 
( ) ∑
=
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, where ( )⋅Yκ  is a kernel function, and 0>b  denotes the scalar 
                                                
9  The „unconditional percentiles“ are the percentiles of the marginal distribution of the outcome vari-
able. 
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bandwidth.10
( )'irttrt πμ zX =
 We make use of the RIF-OLS and regress the percentile-transformed individual 
log real wage change on . The vector z contains the control variables on 
the individual level wherever possible (see Table 2). To estimate the density of the individual 
log real wage change we use a Gaussian kernel.11 b The bandwidth  is set to the ‘optimal’ 
width.12 For the regression we use a one percent stratified sample of our data.13
The UQR shows significantly positive coefficients for the inflation rate for the 90th percentiles. 
These results are consistent with lower inflation leading to a compression of wage increases 
- the upper tail of the unconditional wage change distribution is compressed as a result of 
DNWR. However, only very high wage increases are compressed. In contrast, as has been 
shown above, for the SUR the coefficients for the 70th – 90th respectively 80th – 90th percen-
tiles of the inflation rate are significantly positive. This points to an overestimation of the 
compression of wage increases using SUR. 
 The results 
for the UQR can be found in Table 5.  
The results for the percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are consistent with 
the predictions of the model. In the percentile range above the 10th and below the 30th per-
centiles the coefficients on the inflation rate are significantly negative and the coefficients on 
productivity growth attenuate towards zero. But the coefficients for the UQR are smaller in 
absolute values than for the SUR. 
For percentiles below the range of zero nominal wage changes the results of the UQR fit the 
predictions of the model better than the results of the SUR. Using the CPI as inflation rate, 
the coefficient for inflation for the 10th percentile is significantly negative but smaller in abso-
lute value than for the SUR. Using the PPI as inflation, the coefficients of the inflation rate for 
the two lowest percentiles are significantly positive. Using SUR we only find a non-
significantly positive coefficient for the 10th percentile. This points to an underestimation of 
the compression of very low percentiles of the wage change distribution using SUR. 
As for productivity growth - measured as the average regional wage change - we find coeffi-
cients that are very similar to those obtained using SUR. The coefficients are highest for very 
high percentiles and the coefficients for the 10th percentiles are higher than for the 20th per-
centiles. However, the coefficients for very high percentiles do not rise above unity. 
                                                
10  The influence function ( )YFYIF ,;ν  of a distributional statistic ( )YFν  represents the influence of 
an individual observation on that distributional statistic. Adding back the statistic ( )YFν  to the IF  
yields what Firpo et al. (2009) call the recentered influence function ( )RIF . Therefore for the thτ  
percentile the ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ττττττ τ PfPYPFPYIFPFPYRIF YYY >−+=+= I,;,; . 
11  For the the RIF-OLS we used the Stata ado file provided by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux: 
http://www.econ.ubc.ca/nfortin/.  
12  The ‚optimal‘ width is the width that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data 
were Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used. So it is not optimal in a global sense. 
13  The sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class and occupational 
field. 
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Table 5:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution 
  Consumer Price Index Productivity growth   Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
 Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.039 0.011 0.000 0.845 0.009 0.000  p10 0.042 0.005 0.000 0.911 0.009 0.000 
p20 -0.138 0.006 0.000 0.714 0.005 0.000  p20 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.782 0.006 0.000 
p30 -0.143 0.006 0.000 0.812 0.004 0.000  p30 -0.051 0.002 0.000 0.817 0.004 0.000 
p40 -0.130 0.005 0.000 0.870 0.004 0.000  p40 -0.055 0.002 0.000 0.860 0.004 0.000 
p50 -0.136 0.004 0.000 0.950 0.004 0.000  p50 -0.074 0.002 0.000 0.923 0.004 0.000 
p60 -0.164 0.005 0.000 0.992 0.005 0.000  p60 -0.087 0.002 0.000 0.967 0.005 0.000 
p70 -0.121 0.007 0.000 0.957 0.005 0.000  p70 -0.059 0.003 0.000 0.946 0.005 0.000 
p80 -0.033 0.009 0.001 0.958 0.007 0.000  p80 -0.018 0.004 0.000 0.945 0.007 0.000 
p90 0.066 0.014 0.000 0.991 0.014 0.000  p90 0.044 0.006 0.000 0.990 0.013 0.000 
Unconditional Quantile Regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, current and 
lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with foreign nationality, occupational 
fields, dummy for white-collar worker. Bootstraped standard errors. 50 replications.  
5 Macroeconomic Implications 
In this section we look at the effect of DNWR on average real wage growth and compare the 
estimated effects using the predictions from the SUR and the UQR. According to the underly-
ing theoretical model, downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) should have no effect on 
average real wage growth. Previous empirical studies, however, which neglected the com-
pression of wage increases, report positive estimates on the effects of DNWR on average 
real wage growth (e.g. Card/Hyslop 1997; Knoppik/Beissinger 2003). 
In the previous section we showed that wage increases in Germany are compressed when 
inflation is low. This compression should dampen the so-called “wage sweep-up” effect of 
DNWR and could even completely annihilate any effect of DNWR on average real wage 
growth. In order to quantify the impact of DNWR on real wage growth, we estimate the aver-
age log real wage change when inflation is low ( )Lπ  and average log real wage change 
when inflation is high ( )Hπ  and calculate λˆ , the difference of the estimates. If DNWR has no 
effect on average real wage growth, λˆ  should be zero: 
( ) ( )zz ,,|lnEˆ,,|lnEˆˆ µπµπλ HL ww ∆−∆=  ( )5  
We estimate the expected average log real wage change using the predictions from the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 
from section 4. For the calculations we use the fact that the mean of a random variable may 
be expressed as a simple average of its percentiles.  
As for the SUR, we conduct the regression for 99 percentiles. We then use the results to 
simulate 99 percentiles of the real wage change distribution for a given inflation rate π  for 
each region. Finally we calculate the region size weighted means for the 99 percentiles 
.|πτP  
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As for the UQR, we estimate the effect of inflation for the 99,..,2,1=τ  percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution. We then use the results to simulate 99 real wage change distribu-
tions for a given inflation rate π . Finally we use the thτ  simulated distribution to calculate the 
τ th percentile πτ |P . 
We apply these procedures for the SUR and the UQR for low inflation Lπ  as well as for high 
inflation Hπ , and then calculate λˆ  using the predicted percentiles τP , for 99,...,2,1=τ . 
Hence, .99||ˆ
99
1
99
1






−≈ ∑∑
==
HL PP ππλ
τ
τ
τ
τ  
We use a value for Lπ  equal to 1% and a value for Hπ  equal to 6%.
14 λˆ Since we estimate  
using a difference in inflation of five percentage points, we can interpret 5λˆ  as the average 
change in average real wage growth caused by a decrease in inflation by one percentage 
point. According to the results shown in Table 6, a decrease in inflation by one percentage 
point causes an average increase of real wage growth between 0.001% and 0.058%.15
Table 6: Increase of the average real wage growth due to a decrease in inflation 
 
These results indicate that the effects of DNWR in combination with low inflation on average 
real wage growth, and hence on aggregate real wages, are quite small. 
Regression 
method 
Average log real wage change caused by a decrease 
in inflation by 1 percentage point ( )5λˆ  
SURCPI 0.019% 
SURPPI 0.005% 
UQRCPI 0.058% 
UQRPPI 0.001% 
 
A comparison with results from previous studies (e.g. Card/Hyslop 1997; Knoppik/Beissinger 
2003) unfortunately is not possible. Those studies use a counterfactual wage change distri-
bution - a distribution that would prevail if DNWR would not bind - to calculate the wage 
sweep-up.16
                                                
14  These inflation rates lie in the range of observed inflation rates during the sample period, using 
both the CPI and the PPI as inflation rate (see Table A2). 
 According to our results, the identification of a counterfactual wage change dis-
tribution is not possible because the whole distribution is affected by DNWR. Hence, we un-
15  The results using the PPI as inflation rate are in line with Elsby’s (2009) results. For the US a de-
crease in inflation by one percentage point causes an average increase of real wage growth in the 
range of 0.002%-0.008%. For the UK a decrease in inflation by one percentage point causes an 
average increase of real wage growth of 0.001%. 
16  Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) using the IABS from the Institute for Employment Research - an 1% 
random sample drawn from the German social-security accounts – for the years 1975-1995, esti-
mated at zero inflation a sweep-up range from 0.3 to 0.4 additional percentage points of individual 
expected real wage growth due to wage rigidity. Cornelißen and Hübler (2008) using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1984-2004, estimate that downward wage rigidity 
increases real wage growth even by 3.4 to 4.9 percentage points. 
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fortunately cannot ascertain by how much previous studies overestimate the effect of DNWR 
on average real wage change. However, we certainly know that they do overestimate it. 
To get an insight into the effects of inflation on the amount of real wage cuts and increases 
we estimate ( )π|lnE w∆  for negative and for positive real wage changes (see Table 7).17
Table 7:  Conditional expected real wage change for negative and for positive real wage 
changes 
 
The results confirm that with low inflation a compression of wage increases takes place – the 
expected real wage increases during low inflation are smaller than the expected real wage 
increases during high inflation. With rising inflation the expected real wage increases get lar-
ger, but less people experience a real wage increase. For example, the results for the UQR 
using the CPI as inflation rate show that for low inflation 59% of the workers experience a 
real wage increase while for high inflation only 55% experience a real wage increase. How-
ever, in the latter case the wage increase is more pronounced. In contrast, for low inflation 
only 40% of the worker experience a real wage cut while for high inflation 44% experience a 
real wage cut. It is in this sense that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market in the 
presence of DNWR. 
Regres-
sion 
method 
Lππ =  Hππ =  
( )0ln|lnE <∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE ≥∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE <∆∆ ww  ( )0ln|lnE ≥∆∆ ww  
SURCPI -3.478% (32) 4.263% (67) -3.281% (38) 4.750% (61) 
SURPPI -3.490% (33) 4.352% (66) -3.117% (37) 4.594% (62) 
UQRCPI -5.122% (40) 8.611% (59) -5.012% (44) 8.996% (55) 
UQRPPI -5.131% (41) 8.711% (58) -4.951% (42) 8.810% (57) 
The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
We also estimate ( )π|lnE w∆  for negative and positive nominal wage changes (see Ta-
ble 8).18
                                                
17  Specifically, we estimate 
 The results show that, as expected, with high inflation one observes less nominal 
wage cuts. For example, the results for the UQR with the CPI as inflation rate show that 33% 
of the workers experience a nominal wage cut when inflation is low, while with high inflation 
only 13% experience a nominal wage cut. 
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Table 8:  Conditional expected real wage change for negative and for positive nominal wage 
changes 
Regres-
sion 
method 
Lππ =  Hππ =  
( )π−<∆∆ ww ln|lnE  ( )π−≥∆∆ ww ln|lnE  ( )π−<∆∆ ww ln|lnE  ( )π−≥∆∆ ww ln|lnE  
SURCPI -4.644% (23) 3.701% (76) -9.284% (6) 2.374% (93) 
SURPPI -4.606% (24) 3.768% (75) -9.193% (6) 2.416% (93) 
UQRCPI -6.112% (33) 7.650% (66) -11.071% (13) 4.862% (86) 
UQRPPI -6.096% (34) 7.726% (65) -11.333% (12) 4.945% (87) 
The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that in times of low inflation downward nomi-
nal wage rigidity (DNWR) not only hinders wage cuts but also leads to a compression of 
wage increases. If the latter effect is taken into account, DNWR has a negligible effect on 
average real wage growth, and hence on aggregate real wages.  
The empirical analysis has been undertaken for West-Germany for the period 1975-2007 
using the IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. In line with the litera-
ture our analysis has been confined to “job stayers”, i.e. full-time employees who continually 
exercise the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive years. After our 
data selection we were still able to analyze about 169 million earnings changes, i.e. an aver-
age of more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year. The huge sample size and the reli-
able earnings data are great advantages for our analysis of the impact of DNWR on the 
shape of the real wage change distribution. 
Applying Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to the percentiles of the log real wage 
change distribution at the regional level, we have shown that in Germany a compression of 
wage increases takes place due to DNWR – wage increases are compressed when inflation 
is low. Because the SUR approach does not consider the variance and the cross variable 
covariance of the micro data, we have also applied Unconditional Quantile Regression 
(UQR) to our sample. This regression method allows to estimate the impact of changing the 
distribution of explanatory variables on the marginal percentiles of the dependent variable. 
Using UQR we estimated the impact of inflation on the percentiles of the unconditional real 
wage change distribution. The results confirm a compression of wage increases due to 
DNWR. But compared to the SUR estimates less percentiles of the wage change distribution 
are affected. This points to an overestimation of the compression of wage increases using 
SUR. 
As for the macroeconomic implications of DNWR we find that a decrease in inflation of one 
percentage point only causes an average increase in real wage growth between 0.001% and 
0.058%. These results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument against low 
inflation targets. 
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The results can also be used to evaluate different approaches to analyze DNWR in micro 
data. Our empirical results show that low inflation in combination with DNWR also affects the 
upper tail of the wage change distribution. As a consequence, approaches such as the nor-
mality approach by Borghijs (2001) and the symmetry approach by Card and Hyslop (1997) 
that assume a symmetric counterfactual wage change distribution and infer the shape of the 
lower tail of the counterfactual using the upper part of the wage change distribution are seri-
ously flawed. Other approaches like the earnings-function approach by Altonji and Devereux 
(2000), the histogram-location approach by Kahn (1997), or the approach based on the gen-
eralized hyperbolic distribution by Behr and Pötter (2010) do not assume symmetry of the 
unconditional counterfactual wage change distribution. However, applications of these ap-
proaches also assume that DNWR does not affect higher percentiles of the real wage 
change distribution - an assumption which is challenged by our empirical results. 
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Appendix A: Data Selection and Description 
For our analysis we only use the earning spells of male employees from West Germany19
We also control for further employment spells. If a person has more than one employment 
spell liable to social security – regardless of full- or part-time – we drop the employment 
spell(s) of that person for the particular year. Still, there are some implausibly high growth 
rates of (annual) earnings – up to 260 percent. Until 1999 these are concentrated mainly in 
the group of employees younger than 25 years. This is because not every change in an em-
ployment relationship leads to a new spell. Until 1999 e.g. the BeH item ‘class of worker’ con-
tains only the last status of the particular year. If a person ends an apprenticeship in the mid-
dle of a year, and then is gainfully employed by the same employer for the rest of the year as 
well as the next year, we will observe the person as being gainfully employed two years in 
row. Given that after the apprenticeship the respective person is typically earning more than 
double the previous income, an implausibly high growth rate of annual earnings is observed. 
To make sure that this and other effects are not at work in our data, we only analyze (annual) 
wage changes that are higher than the one percent percentile and lower than the 99 percent 
percentile. 
 
aged 16 to 65. We distinguish between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. The 
workers must be subject to social security without particular tokens and being gainfully em-
ployed in the same occupation by the same employer throughout the year for at least two 
consecutive years. The earnings are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored the earnings 
changes cannot be computed correctly. Since the monthly income is censored too, it is pos-
sible that yearly earnings are below the contribution assessment ceiling, even if several 
monthly earnings are censored. This causes some noise for earnings hardly below the con-
tribution assessment ceiling. Therefore earnings spells above 0.96 times the contribution 
assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme are dropped. 
After the selection, the remaining spells comprise 50,575,416 salary changes of white-collar 
workers as well as 118,593,371 wage changes of blue-collar workers (see Table A1). 
                                                
19  Except (West) Berlin. 
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Table A1: Earnings spells, and observable earnings changes for the BeH and our datasets 
Year Employee History File (BeH)  
Source: IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH) V08.01, Nürnberg 2009, Tab. 3.4, pp. 13-14. 
Dataset for white-collar workers 
(job stayers) 
 
Dataset for blue-collar  
workers 
(job stayers) total BeH white-collar workers blue-collar workers 
Number of 
spells 
Number of 
persons 
Number of 
new persons 
Number of 
spells 
% of all 
BeH spells 
Number of 
spells 
% of all BeH 
spells 
Observable 
salary changes 
to the previous 
year 
% of all white-
collar workers 
spells 
Observable 
wage changes 
to the previous 
year 
% of all 
blue-collar 
workers 
spells 
1975 25,477,714 22,229,687 22,229,687 8,017,135 31.47 13,115,611 51.48 -------------- ------- -------------- ------- 
1976 26,312,435 22,027,301 1,821,120 8,162,966 31.02 13,588,660 51.64 1,223,461 14.99 4,001,617 29.45 
1977 26,536,964 22,268,246 1,524,711 8,326,823 31.38 13,423,461 50.58 1,339,689 16.09 4,008,105 29.86 
1978 26,582,142 22,280,456 1,422,128 8,504,452 31.99 13,125,102 49.38 1,455,036 17.11 3,987,076 30.38 
1979 27,735,013 23,050,680 1,519,340 8,741,313 31.52 13,666,833 49.28 1,549,174 17.72 4,026,094 29.46 
1980 27,915,481 23,368,670 1,447,888 8,958,331 32.09 13,641,632 48.87 1,550,299 17.31 4,074,915 29.87 
1981 27,446,754 23,465,968 1,234,982 9,062,261 33.02 13,059,120 47.58 1,613,492 17.80 4,229,974 32.39 
1982 26,601,318 23,174,161 1,115,916 8,912,796 33.51 12,293,271 46.21 1,724,945 19.35 4,267,181 34.71 
1983 25,999,555 22,761,297 1,084,306 8,785,081 33.79 11,786,115 45.33 1,823,678 20.76 4,260,338 36.15 
1984 26,649,448 22,892,553 1,145,787 8,811,489 33.06 12,226,538 45.88 1,652,739 18.76 4,057,593 33.19 
1985 26,704,365 22,781,837 1,091,527 8,759,642 32.80 12,232,551 45.81 1,541,769 17.60 3,966,506 32.43 
1986 27,541,879 23,436,642 1,119,212 9,256,438 33.61 12,326,805 44.76 1,539,611 16.63 4,014,362 32.57 
1987 28,116,787 23,677,568 1,074,500 9,554,798 33.98 12,439,379 44.24 1,555,887 16.28 4,018,113 32.30 
1988 28,698,344 23,786,816 1,033,231 9,882,373 34.44 12,667,343 44.14 1,587,020 16.06 3,988,695 31.49 
1989 29,822,255 24,267,501 1,199,883 10,322,363 34.61 13,178,397 44.19 1,587,684 15.38 3,961,452 30.06 
1990 31,784,818 25,217,847 1,645,845 10,910,750 34.33 14,143,744 44.50 1,517,988 13.91 3,815,151 26.97 
1991 37,527,796 30,390,685 6,141,237 11,316,503 30.15 14,230,801 37.92 1,485,069 13.12 3,912,383 27.49 
1992 39,806,357 32,367,400 4,452,503 14,526,173 36.49 17,151,872 43.09 1,518,998 10.46 4,086,827 23.83 
1993 38,726,145 31,468,111 1,258,045 14,288,414 36.90 16,307,187 42.11 1,559,944 10.92 4,040,428 24.78 
1994 37,109,938 30,765,834 1,150,297 13,658,194 36.80 15,413,334 41.53 1,678,306 12.29 3,993,359 25.91 
1995 37,428,190 30,718,658 1,158,163 13,808,067 36.89 15,391,415 41.12 1,704,648 12.35 3,872,681 25.16 
1996 36,116,981 30,284,347 1,096,866 13,279,672 36.77 14,530,125 40.23 1,695,637 12.77 3,759,385 25.87 
1997 36,708,737 30,034,750 1,224,453 13,221,938 36.02 14,277,362 38.89 1,755,706 13.28 3,765,959 26.38 
1998 37,126,961 30,696,402 1,485,883 13,559,574 36.52 13,878,339 37.38 1,716,299 12.66 3,620,074 26.08 
1999 45,866,082 35,023,973 2,979,728 14,432,989 31.47 14,799,245 32.27 1,582,533 10.96 3,311,996 22.38 
2000 48,046,644 35,989,747 1,700,270 14,635,674 30.46 15,064,596 31.35 1,538,716 10.51 3,222,105 21.39 
2001 48,957,095 36,063,811 1,421,173 15,132,476 30.91 15,157,937 30.96 1,479,744 9.78 3,057,588 20.17 
2002 47,356,880 35,459,833 1,185,798 14,927,452 31.52 14,240,501 30.07 1,422,480 9.53 2,906,075 20.41 
2003 50,878,383 35,163,454 1,142,687 14,850,117 29.19 14,130,373 27.77 1,450,294 9.77 2,901,505 20.53 
2004 47,152,731 35,076,422 1,105,978 14,314,460 30.36 13,370,424 28.36 1,650,762 11.53 2,889,431 21.61 
2005 46,250,593 34,574,481 1,092,777 13,542,098 29.28 12,957,363 28.02 1,710,424 12.63 2,920,200 22.54 
2006 47,148,366 34,856,424 1,154,210 13,559,054 28.76 13,237,171 28.08 1,759,427 12.98 2,907,775 21.97 
2007 49,182,872 35,427,149 1,235,771 14,326,287 29.13 13,710,683 27.88 1,603,957 11.20 2,748,428 20.05 
Sum 1,171,326,023 ---------------- 72,695,902 382,348,153 32.64 454,763,290 38.82 50,575,416 13.23 118,593,371 26.08 
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For each employee we have the following information: 
Gross annual earnings: 
• salary: gross annual salary of a full-time white-collar worker 
• wage: gross annual wage of a full-time worker 
The earnings are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitrags-
bemessungsgrenze). Spells with censored earnings, as well as spells with earnings higher 
than 0.96 times the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance 
scheme, are dropped. 
The lower limit of earnings is given by the earnings limit for “marginal” part-time work-
ers/fringe workers (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze; see Table A2). These workers are not included in 
the BeH. 
The BeH does not allow separating fringe benefits from “regular” earnings. This is important 
because before 1984 the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. Since 
1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to social security taxation and are 
therefore included in the data. This leads to a level effect on the 1983-1984 (log) earnings 
changes. However, observations before and after 1984 should be valid. If some employers 
reported fringe benefits before 1984 and other did not, it is very likely that employers were 
usually consistent in their reporting behaviour.  
Gross average daily earnings: 
• gross average daily salary of a full-time white-collar worker 
• gross average daily wage of a full-time blue-collar worker 
The BeH contains no data on hours worked except for information about part-time or full-time 
employment. Therefore, it is not possible to compute hourly earnings. Since we cannot ob-
serve changes in the working time – as long as the threshold for part-time employment is not 
crossed –we sometimes observe implausibly high growth rates of (annual) earnings. 
Using gross annual earnings and the duration of the employment spell, we calculate gross 
average daily earnings. Since white-collar workers are being paid the same salary every 
month – irrespective of the number of working days – we calculate the gross average daily 
salary for a 365-day year. For workers we use the exact duration of the employment spell to 
calculate the gross average daily wages. To avoid any contamination with working time ef-
fects, only full-time employment spells are included. 
Duration of employment: 
The duration of employment is not consistent with the actual days worked, but represents the 
duration of the employment contract liable to social security. To make sure that a person is 
employed all the year, we drop all spells with durations of employment of less than 365 days. 
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Employment relationship: 
The BeH contains 32 classifications for employment relationships – such as trainees, insured 
artistes and publicists and employees in partial retirement. We only keep employees subject 
to social security without particular tokens. 
Class of worker: 
The BeH contains eight classes of workers: (1) trainees, (2) workers, (3) skilled workers20, (4) 
master craftsmen and foremen21
We drop all classes except of ‘white-collar workers’, ‘workers’ and ‘skilled workers’. The two 
latter classes are combined to the class ‘blue-collar workers’. 
, (5) white-collar workers, (6) home workers, (7) people with 
less than 18 weekly hours of work, and (8) people with 18 and more weekly hours of work 
but not fully employed.  
Occupational classification: 
This variable describes the field of an employee’s occupational specialization. The BeH cov-
ers 86 occupation groups containing 328 occupations. These groups are use to control for 
job stayer. They are subsumed to six occupational fields which are used in the regressions. 
Qualification level of an employee: 
This variable includes eight categories: (1) no formal education, (2) lower secondary school 
and intermediate (secondary) school without vocational qualification, (3) lower secondary 
school and intermediate (secondary) school with vocational qualification, (4) upper secon-
dary school examination without vocational qualification, (5) upper secondary school exami-
nation with vocational qualification, (6) post-secondary technical college degree, (7) univer-
sity degree, and (8) no classification applicable. 
The qualification level ‘no classification applicable’ is subsumed to ‘no formal education’. 
Age of a person: 
Age a person is turning in the particular year – only spells from persons aged 16 to 65 are 
kept. 
Further data: 
Inflation: 
As inflation we use two variables: 
• Change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany to the previous year (see 
Table A2). We interlinked the CPI (available for 1995-2007) with the cost-of-living in-
dex of all private households for West Germany (available for 1962-1999). 
• Change of the Producer Price Index for Germany to the previous year (see Table A2). 
                                                
20  The class also contains master craftsmen and foremen (Bender et al. 1996). 
21  Persons in this class are employed as blue-collar or white-collar workers. 
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Table A2:  Contribution assessment ceiling for Western Germany, lower earnings limit, and 
inflation 
Contribution assessment ceiling for Western Germany (Euro per year)22 Change of the Ger-
man Consumer 
Price Index
 
23
Change of the Ger-
man Producer 
Price Index to the 
previous year in % 
24
Year  to the 
previous year in % 
Compulsory pen-
sion insurance 
scheme 
‘Knappschaftliche’ 
pension insurance 
Lower earnings 
limit 
(§8, Social Code IV) 
1975 17,179.41 20,860.71 2,147.40  6,03 4.66 
1976 19,020.06 23,314.91 2,377.56  4,22 3.74 
1977 20,860.71 25,769.11 *2,607.60  3,70 2.75 
1978 22,701.36 28,223.31 2,392.80  2,72 1.17 
1979 24,542.01 29,450.41 2,392.80  4,13 4.63 
1980 25,769.11 31,291.06 2,392.80  5,40 7.58 
1981 26,996.21 33,131.71 2,392.80  6,33 7.78 
1982 28,836.86 35,585.91 2,392.80  5,24 5.99 
1983 30,677.51 37,426.57 2,392.80  3,23 1.41 
1984 31,904.61 39,267.22 2,392.80  2,48 2.92 
1985 33,131.71 41,107.87 2,454.24  2,04 2.34 
1986 34,358.81 42,334.97 2,515.56  -0,12 -2.53 
1987 34,972.36 43,562.07 2,638.32  0,25 -2.35 
1988 36,813.02 44,789.17 2,699.64  1,25 1.14 
1989 37,426.57 46,016.27 2,760.96  2,83 3.25 
1990 38,653.67 47,856.92 2,883.72  2,63 1.69 
1991 39,880.77 49,084.02 2,945.04  3,73 2.38 
1992 41,721.42 51,538.22 3,067.80  3,93 1.40 
1993 44,175.62 54,605.97 3,251.76  3,57 0.00 
1994 46,629.82 57,673.72 3,435.84  2,71 0.57 
1995 47,856.92 58,900.82 3,558.60  1,63 1.71 
1996 49,084.02 60,127.93 3,619.92  1,38 -1.23 
1997 50,311.12 61,968.58 3,742.68  1,93 1.25 
1998 51,538.22 63,195.68 3,804.00  1,00 -0.45 
1999 52,151.77 63,809.23 3,865.32  0,55 -1.01 
2000 52,765.32 65,036.33 3,865.32  1,42 3.07 
2001 53,378.87 65,649.88 3,865.32  1,94 2.98 
2002 54,000.00 66,600.00 3,900.00  1,48 -0.64 
2003 61,200.00 75,000.00 3,900.00  1,04 1.73 
2004 61,800.00 76,200.00 4,800.00  1,65 1.59 
2005 62,400.00 76,800.00 4,800.00  1,52 4.38 
2006 63,000.00 77,400.00 4,800.00  1,60 5.40 
2007 63,000.00 77,400.00 4,800.00  2,26 1.33 
* Ex July 1st, 1977: € 2,270.16. 
 
Contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze): 
The earnings covered by the BeH are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling. 
The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes of earnings. Some 
employees – miners, mine-employees, sailors and railroad employees – are insured in a 
special pension insurance, called ‘knappschaftliche’ pension insurance. The contribution as-
sessment ceiling of this pension insurance is always higher than for the compulsory pension 
insurance scheme (see Table A2). Since 1999, the BeH does not indicate anymore in which 
pension insurance a person is insured. For this reason, we only use the contribution as-
sessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme. 
                                                
22  Values from 1975 until 2001 converted from DM into Euro. Source: Deutsch Rentenversicherung 
Knappschaft-Bahn-See; Hauptverwaltung Bochum. 
23  Consumer Price Index for Germany (1995-2007) interlinked with the cost-of-living index of all pri-
vate households for West Germany (1974-1994). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
24  Development of prices ex 1995 are based on the development in the whole Federal Republic of 
Germany. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2, 10/2009, p. 27. 
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Appendix B: Impact of Inflation on the Conditional Percentiles using 
Quantile Regression 
To observe the effect of inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage change dis-
tribution we regress real wage change w∆  on the inflation rate π , the average regional real 
wage growth μ  (as a proxy for productivity growth), and further control variables. 
We make use of the Quantile Regression (Koenker/Bassett 1978; Koenker 2005) and model 
conditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution as functions of predictors: 
( ) ( ) ( ).  with| ''' irttrtirtirtirtw πμQ i zxβxx ==∆ ττ  
The vector z contains, as for the Unconditional Quantile Regression, the control variables 
(see Table 2). For the Quantile Regressions (QR) we use a one percent stratified sample of 
our data.25
The results (see Table B1) show that at some degree not only the highest wage increases 
are compressed if inflation is low (see results Chapter 4.1), but that also the highest wage 
increases conditional on the attributes of the employee and conditional on the region where 
the employee works are compressed if inflation is low and DNWR binds. 
  
Table B1:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the conditional
  
 percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution using Quantile Regression 
Consumer Price Index Productivity growth   Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
 Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
p10 -0.082 0.011 0.000 0.899 0.008 0.000  p10 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.971 0.008 0.000 
p20 -0.142 0.006 0.000 0.843 0.005 0.000  p20 -0.021 0.003 0.000 0.883 0.004 0.000 
p30 -0.152 0.004 0.000 0.856 0.004 0.000  p30 -0.048 0.002 0.000 0.872 0.003 0.000 
p40 -0.151 0.004 0.000 0.876 0.004 0.000  p40 -0.068 0.002 0.000 0.868 0.003 0.000 
p50 -0.144 0.004 0.000 0.880 0.003 0.000  p50 -0.072 0.002 0.000 0.861 0.003 0.000 
p60 -0.124 0.005 0.000 0.879 0.004 0.000  p60 -0.062 0.002 0.000 0.856 0.004 0.000 
p70 -0.081 0.007 0.000 0.894 0.005 0.000  p70 -0.044 0.003 0.000 0.870 0.005 0.000 
p80 -0.039 0.008 0.000 0.910 0.006 0.000  p80 -0.018 0.004 0.000 0.891 0.007 0.000 
p90 0.008 0.015 0.575 0.935 0.010 0.000  p90 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.938 0.010 0.000 
Quantile Regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged unemploy-
ment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with foreign nationality, occupational fields, dummy 
for white-collar worker. Bootstraped standard errors. 50 replications. 
  
                                                
25  Sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class and occupational field. 
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Appendix C: Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles 
using Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression 
We estimate regressions with region-specific dummies of the following form by OLS: 
rtrt rtrtt
zP ττττττ ερµβπηα ++++=
' , where 
rt
Pτ  is the 
thτ  percentile of the DFL re-weighted 
real wage growth distribution in region r  at time t ,  is the frictionless average real wage 
growth (measured using the observed regional average real wage growth rate), tπ  is the 
inflation rate. The vector rtz  contains further control variables shown in Table 2. 
Table C1:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional
  
 percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution using Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression 
Consumer Price Index Productivity growth   Producer Price Index Productivity growth 
 Coef. R.Std. 
Err. 
P>|t| Coef. R.Std. 
Err. 
P>|t|   Coef. R.Std. 
Err. 
P>|t| Coef. R.Std. 
Err. 
P>|t| 
p10 -0.100 0.068 0.148 0.875 0.056 0.000  p10 0.010 0.022 0.649 0.930 0.050 0.000 
p20 -0.142 0.024 0.000 0.825 0.026 0.000  p20 -0.038 0.015 0.014 0.865 0.032 0.000 
p30 -0.104 0.030 0.002 0.901 0.038 0.000  p30 -0.034 0.014 0.019 0.928 0.037 0.000 
p40 -0.111 0.045 0.021 0.940 0.049 0.000  p40 -0.073 0.015 0.000 0.932 0.042 0.000 
p50 -0.092 0.037 0.019 0.943 0.038 0.000  p50 -0.064 0.010 0.000 0.936 0.028 0.000 
p60 -0.042 0.035 0.247 0.978 0.031 0.000  p60 -0.044 0.009 0.000 0.962 0.022 0.000 
p70 0.011 0.031 0.715 1.001 0.025 0.000  p70 -0.016 0.011 0.162 0.984 0.023 0.000 
p80 0.058 0.032 0.080 1.028 0.026 0.000  p80 0.014 0.015 0.353 1.016 0.032 0.000 
p90 0.102 0.049 0.047 1.067 0.045 0.000  p90 0.055 0.022 0.019 1.071 0.051 0.000 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression. We estimate the regressions weighed by region size and relax the assumption of 
independence within years. Controls: regions, mean age, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged unemployment rate, 
dummy for the year 1984, percentage of the educational classes, percentage of workers with foreign nationality, percentage of 
white-collar worker, percentage of the occupational fields. 
The estimated coefficients of this Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression are iden-
tical to those of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with small-sample adjustment 
and weighting by region size of Section 4.1. But the residuals differ since the LSDV regres-
sion ignores the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals. 
A comparison with the results of SUR shows that all estimated coefficients of the SUR are at 
least as significant as the results of the LSDV regression and most coefficients of the SUR – 
especially those for the inflation – are even more highly significant as the coefficients of the 
LSDV regression. 
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